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The economic changes associated with globalization tighten financial pressures on governments of
high-income countries by increasing the demand for government spending while making it more costly
to raise tax revenue.  Greater international mobility of economic activity, and associated responsiveness
of the tax base to tax rates, increases the economic distortions created by taxation.  Countries with
small open economies have relatively mobile tax bases; as a result, they rely much less heavily on
corporate and personal income taxes than do other countries.  The evidence indicates that a ten percent
smaller population in 1999 is associated with a one percent smaller ratio of personal and corporate
income tax collections to total tax revenues.  Governments of small countries instead rely on consumption-type
taxes, including taxes on sales of goods and services and import tariffs, much more heavily than do
larger countries.  Since the rapid pace of globalization implies that all countries are becoming small
open economies, this evidence suggests that the use of expenditure taxes is likely to increase, posing
challenges to governments concerned about recent changes in income distribution.
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There is a discomfort current in high income countries, as governments face excess 
demand for the services they provide together with difficulty raising revenue needed to finance 
greater expenditures or even to maintain services at levels to which their populations have grown 
accustomed.  The mismatch of desires and means is an old and common story, hardly unique to 
governments, and not any easier for its banality.  Changing world economic conditions, the 
globalization of production and markets, and the economic awakening of much of the world’s 
population, have contributed to the problems confronting governments of affluent countries even 
as they have made possible some of the most exciting developments of modern times. 
Economic theory offers insights chiefly into the dire consequences of possible methods 
that governments might use to address their financial difficulties.  Efforts to tax mobile economic 
activity stimulate mobility and thereby create economic distortions as business activities, capital 
and labor are reallocated for tax rather than productivity reasons.  Sophisticated tax avoidance 
through financial and other means reduces the revenue potential of high rates of income taxation 
and further contributes to the economic cost of taxation.  Taxes on capital income distort the 
intertemporal allocation of consumption due to the compounding of effective tax rates over time.  
And redistributive taxation that subjects income to high marginal rates of effective taxation 
creates its own economic distortions. 
The economic costs of raising tax revenue are particularly worrisome in an environment 
in which governments face significant demands on their resources.  Despite the greater general 
affluence associated with globalization, some segments of industrial societies, particularly those 
relying on returns to less-skilled labor, may be adversely affected by resulting price changes.  
The accompanying social dislocations put pressures on governments to soften the impact of 
global economic changes,
1 and, if possible, respond in ways that help their populations thrive in 
more globally competitive markets.  Social welfare programs have for many years served the 
first of these functions and education and training programs the second; all of these are 
                                                 
1 Rodrik (1998) offers evidence that open economies have larger government sectors than do closed economies, 
which he attributes to their greater demand for public expenditures that cushion the effects of globalization. 
  1expensive, so there is understandable interest in the ability of governments to maintain their 
funding in an era in which most large countries have open economies. 
One of the potential challenges for governments that are eager to maintain and possibly 
strengthen their spending programs is that the same forces that are responsible for recent 
economic changes might also raise the cost of financing government programs with certain types 
of taxes.  The relative ease of international trade, capital movement and communication makes it 
possible for production to locate in many places around the world and for tax burdens to be 
avoided through international transactions.  Since location choices, activity levels, and taxable 
incomes are sensitive to local tax rates, it stands to reason that governments would feel 
intensifying international pressure to reduce tax burdens on business activities, investors, and 
possibly high net worth individuals.  If tax rates fall without other compensating changes, then 
government tax revenues will decline, and with them government expenditures.  A general 
reduction in government expenditures entails reduced outlays on social welfare and education 
programs, particularly since there are no countervailing international pressures on governments 
to maintain this spending.
2
How then can governments find revenues to finance social spending and other programs 
without creating enormous economic distortions?  Distortions are minimized by taxing bases that 
are least responsive to taxation.  Land is the classic example of a factor inelastic in supply and 
therefore nondistortionary to tax, though taxing land raises other issues and in any case modern 
governments require far more revenue than is feasible to obtain from land taxes alone. 
A good part of the problem facing governments is the mobility and potential mobility of 
economic activity.  Some aspects of this mobility are clearly observable, taking the form of 
foreign direct investment by multinational firms, portfolio investment by individuals and 
financial institutions, international trade, immigration of individuals, international licensing of 
intangible property, and other forms of international factor mobility.  Other features of mobility 
are more subtle, taking the form of businesses that thrive in locations that heretofore would not 
have been suitable for them, workforces that need not move because markets come to them, and 
ideas that are adopted everywhere.  In the absence of coordinated government policies, the 
                                                 
2 See Avi-Yonah (2000) for an elaboration of this argument. 
  2potential mobility of economic activity makes it extremely difficult for governments to exploit 
monopoly positions over much of their tax bases, thereby greatly contributing to the distortions 
created in the course of raising tax revenue. 
The behavior of governments during the era of globalization offers clues to the likely 
course of future developments.  Small countries with their relatively more open economies have 
always faced greater international pressures than have large countries, and their fiscal systems 
therefore had to adapt earlier than did large countries to the greater mobility that open markets 
create.  Globalization means that in some sense all countries are becoming smaller.  In order to 
explore the likely consequences for large countries of globalizing trends, it is therefore useful to 
consider the tax policies that small countries use, and in particular the way that their tax policies 
have differed from those in larger countries. 
The evidence indicates that small counties rely much less than other countries do on 
income taxes imposed on individuals and corporations.  While small and more open economies 
certainly use income taxes, their governments rely much less on these taxes than they do on 
expenditure-type taxes such as excise, sales and value-added taxes as well as tariffs on imported 
goods.  The cross-sectional evidence for 1999 is that a ten percent smaller national population is 
associated with a one percent lower ratio of income taxes to total tax revenue, and panel 
evidence points to even stronger effects of changes in country size on the use of income taxes. 
Expenditure-type taxes have risen in popularity everywhere in the world, as reflected in 
the fact that more than 130 countries now impose significant value-added taxes, and there is 
widespread reliance on excise taxes on gasoline and other commodities.  The popularity of 
expenditure taxes is due in part to their administrative and enforcement features, and in part to 
their efficiency properties.  In a globalizing world, expenditures have relatively clear geographic 
associations, reducing the potential for international tax avoidance and generally reducing the 
mobility of the tax base compared to alternatives such as personal income taxes or source-based 
business taxes including the corporate income tax.  Expenditure taxes do not directly tax capital 
returns, but do so indirectly by taxing all returns when spent on goods and services, which has 
the effect of taxing pure profits on capital investments while effectively exempting normal 
returns to saving.   
  3Heavy use of expenditure taxation in place of income taxation can carry serious 
implications for tax progressivity, since in practice many expenditure taxes have flat rates that 
make them much less progressive than income tax alternatives.  Absence of tax progressivity is 
not intrinsic to taxing expenditures, since it is possible to tax lightly goods purchased 
disproportionately by low income families, though there are serious limits to the amount of 
redistribution that can be achieved that way.
3  It is possible to couple the adoption of new 
expenditure taxes with offsetting distributional changes in income taxation, as proposed by 
Graetz (2002) and others, though there are realistic questions about whether countries in practice 
are capable of enacting such sweeping reforms.  Furthermore, there are serious proposals to 
institute progressive expenditure-type taxes, which could be implemented by countries such as 
the United States through relatively minor adjustments to existing taxes.  In the absence of 
compensating adjustment to other taxes and expenditures, however, the most likely outcome of 
greater reliance on expenditure type taxation is reduced overall fiscal progressivity.  Given recent 
changes in income distributions, governments may be dissatisfied with such an outcome, and 
seek creative alternatives that permit fiscal progressivity to accompany sufficient revenue 
generation. 
2.  Tax policy pressures on the United States 
The world economy has grown considerably more open and integrated in every decade 
since the Second World War.  During the period from 1950 to 2004, total world exports and 
imports grew by an average of 5.9 percent a year.
4  While this reflects in part the growth of the 
world economy, it also reflects the impact of reduced transportation and communication costs, 
falling tariff rates, and reductions in other impediments to international business.  From 1950 to 
1975, world exports and imports grew by 2.2 percent a year relative to world output, and trade in 
manufacturing grew by 2.6 percent a year relative to output.  From 1975 to 2004 the rate of 
growth of international trade relative to world output quickened for all goods to 2.3 percent a 
year, and for manufacturing to 3.0 percent a year.  The openness of world economies is likewise 
reflected in a marked growth of foreign direct investment. 
                                                 
3 See, for example, the analysis in Sah (1983). 
4 See Hummels (2007) for detailed evidence of the growth of world trade since 1950. 
  4Changes to the world economy have coincided with significant changes to the 
distribution of income in the United States and other high-income countries.  Table 1 presents 
data compiled by the Congressional Budget Office on shares of pretax income accounted for by 
different income groups in the United States.  The highest quintile of the income distribution 
received 45.5 percent of household income in 1979, a figure that rose to 55.1 percent by 2005.  
The top one percent of families had 9.3 percent of total income in 1979, whereas the 
corresponding figure for 2005 is 18.1 percent.  At the other end of the income distribution, the 
lowest quintile in 1979 received 5.8 percent of family income, a ratio that fell to just 4.0 percent 
by 2005.  By just about any measure income has become significantly less evenly distributed in 
the United States over the past three decades.  There is considerable controversy over the extent 
to which changes to income distributions in wealthy countries can be attributed to the growth of 
international trade and investment, though the evidence reviewed by Feenstra and Hanson (2004) 
strongly suggests that globalization has contributed significantly to income inequality. 
The changing income distribution creates demands for the U.S. government to improve 
the economic prospects of the disadvantaged with education, training, and other programs, and to 
modify the after-tax distribution of income through the tax and transfer system.  Creating 
meaningful new national economic opportunities with education and training programs requires 
significant expenditures that entail substantial new financing sources, typically in the form of 
higher taxes.  Redistributing income through the tax system also requires high tax rates, 
including not only taxes on affluent individuals and families but high implicit tax rates on 
means-tested transfers to low-income individuals and families. 
Perhaps the most significant sectoral shift of modern times is the rising fraction of 
national resources devoted to health spending.  The government is heavily involved in all matters 
concerning health, so rising health costs together with limits to the ability of private individuals 
and their employers to finance adequate health coverage put enormous potential burdens on 
governments to make up any differences.  Table 2 presents recent estimates from the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services of historical and projected health care expenditures by private 
individuals and the public sector in the United States.  As is evident from this table, annual 
federal government health spending is projected to rise from its 2006 level of $664 billion to 
$1.471 trillion by 2017, thereby more than doubling per capita annual federal government 
  5spending from $2,217 in 2006 to $4,505 in 2017.  Over the same period state and local 
governments are projected to increase their per capita annual health spending from $826 to 
$1,568.  Even with this growing support from different levels of government, total per capita 
private health expenditures, including private health insurance, out-of-pocket payments, and 
other private expenditures, are anticipated to grow from $3,517 in 2006 to $6,203 by 2017. 
Significantly increased public spending on health care requires greater resources for all 
levels of government.  In addition, rising per capita private health care costs contribute to 
financial burdens on private individuals, particularly those without access to generous employer-
provided health insurance.  This, in turn, adds to the demand for public support of low-income 
individuals and families. 
Changes to the distribution of income and rising health care expenditures are just two of 
several trends that contribute to U.S. government revenue needs in the coming years.  An aging 
population requires greater spending on public pensions, including social security and disability 
insurance, and an aging public infrastructure creates significant needs for greater spending on 
roads and highways, sewer systems, port and airport facilities, telecommunications, and other 
elements of public infrastructure.  At the same time that the U.S. government faces greater 
expenditure demands, its ability to finance expenditures is limited by greater mobility of the tax 
base and competition from other parts of the world for mobile economic activity. 
Rising levels of worldwide foreign direct investment have the potential to trigger rounds 
of competitive business tax reductions, as countries seek to attract the employment opportunities, 
productivity spillovers, and other economic benefits commonly associated with greater 
investment, particularly foreign investment.  Countries have incentives to reduce business tax 
rates if they believe that lower tax rates will be associated with greater economic activity, higher 
tax base, or both.  While evidence of growing foreign direct investment does not by itself 
demonstrate that tax policies influence the magnitude and performance of international 
investment, there is ample separate evidence that they do. 
  6A substantial body of research considers how taxation influences the activities of 
multinational firms.
5  This literature considers the effects of taxation on investment and on tax 
avoidance activities.  With respect to investment, tax policies are obviously capable of affecting 
the volume and location of foreign direct investment, since all other considerations equal, higher 
tax rates reduce after-tax returns, thereby reducing incentives to commit investment funds.  This 
literature identifies the effects of taxes through time-series estimation of the responsiveness of 
foreign direct investment to annual variation in after-tax rates of return and cross-sectional 
studies that exploit the large differences in corporate tax rates around the world to identify the 
effects of taxes on foreign direct investment.  The first generation of these studies, reviewed in 
Hines (1997, 1999), reports tax elasticities of investment in the neighborhood of –0.6.  What this 
means is that a ten percent tax reduction (for example, reducing the corporate tax rate from 35 
percent to 31.5 percent) should be associated with six percent greater inbound foreign 
investment.  More recent evidence suggests that foreign direct investment is even more tax 
sensitive than this.
6
Contractual arrangements between related parties located in countries with different tax 
rates offer numerous possibilities for sophisticated tax avoidance.  It is widely suspected that 
firms select transfer prices used for within-firm transactions with the goal of reducing their total 
tax obligations.  Multinational firms typically can benefit by reducing prices charged by affiliates 
in high-tax countries for items and services provided to affiliates in low-tax countries.  OECD 
governments require firms to use transfer prices that would be paid by unrelated parties, but 
enforcement is difficult, particularly when pricing issues concern differentiated or proprietary 
items such as patent rights.  Given the looseness of the resulting legal restrictions, it is entirely 
possible for firms to adjust transfer prices in a tax-sensitive fashion without violating any laws.  
Multinational firms can structure a variety of transactions – intrafirm debt, royalty payments, 
dividend repatriations, and intrafirm trade – in a manner that is conducive to tax avoidance.  
                                                 
5 See Gordon and Hines (2002), Devereux (2006) and Hines (2006), from which some of this material is drawn, for 
recent surveys.  For a fuller discussion of the tax rules facing U.S. multinational firms and the evidence on 
behavioral responses to international taxation of U.S. multinationals, see Hines (1997, 1999) and Desai, Foley and 
Hines (2003).     
6 For example, Altshuler, Grubert and Newlon (2001) compare the tax sensitivity of aggregate capital ownership in 
58 countries in 1984 to that in 1992, reporting estimated tax elasticities that rise (in absolute value) from –1.5 in 
1984 to –2.8 in 1992.  Altshuler and Grubert (2004) offer evidence of a -3.5 tax elasticity of investment in a sample 
of 58 countries in 2000. 
  7Studies of the responsiveness of firms to taxes on these margins examine reported profitabilities, 
tax liabilities, and specific measures of financial and merchandise trade in order to identify the 
effects of taxes.
7
Taken together, this evidence implies that the volume of foreign direct investment, and 
accompanying economic activity and corporate tax bases, is highly responsive to local tax 
policies.  It follows that countries contemplating lowering their corporate income tax rates can 
reasonably expect to receive significantly greater foreign investment as a consequence.  Active 
tax avoidance on the part of international investors implies that taxable income conditional on 
investment levels also responds strongly to tax rate changes.  The combination of these two 
effects reduces the budgetary cost to a single country that reduces its tax rate, since a lower tax 
rate is accompanied by a larger tax base due both to greater investment and to greater taxable 
income associated with local investment.  The incentive to reduce corporate tax rates in order to 
attract foreign direct investment has increased since the early 1980s, as levels of world foreign 
direct investment rose sharply during that time. 
3.  Economic globalization and tax competition 
  It stands to reason that countries eager to attract tax bases might compete with each other 
by reducing tax rates, as a result of which taxes, and therefore government expenditures, are 
driven to inefficiently low levels.  The likelihood of such an outcome depends on the tax 
instruments available to governments and the nature of the competitive environment.  In order to 
evaluate this prospect it is helpful to consider the incentives that countries face. 
Our understanding of the tax rate implications of international capital mobility dates to 
Diamond and Mirrlees (1971), who demonstrate that efficient taxation in a small open economy 
entails zero taxation of income earned by foreign investors.  The explanation for their result is 
that any positive taxation distorts the economy more than would other tax alternatives, without 
                                                 
7 For evidence on intrafirm trade, see Clausing (2001, 2003) and Swenson (2001).  For evidence on intrafirm debt, 
see Desai, Foley and Hines (2004), Huizinga, Laeven and Nicodeme (2006), and Grubert (1998).  For evidence on 
royalties, see Grubert (1998) and Hines (1995).  For evidence on dividend repatriations, see Desai, Foley and Hines 
(2001) and Hines and Hubbard (1990).  See Grubert and Mutti (1991) and Hines and Rice (1994) for evidence on 
differences in reported profitability in response to tax rates.  While these studies exclusively use data on U.S. 
multinationals, Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003) use country level data within the OECD to identify the prevalence 
of profit-shifting activities more generally.    
  8shifting any of the tax burden to foreign investors.
8  If international capital flows are increasingly 
sensitive to tax rate differences, then incentives to reduce tax rates are presumably rising as well.  
The analysis also implies that countries that nevertheless persist in taxing income earned by 
foreign investors will have lower incomes than those that do not. 
The Diamond and Mirrlees result is commonly thought to imply that small countries have 
the least to gain from attempting to impose taxes on investment.  Small countries are believed to 
face the most elastic corporate tax bases, and therefore to have the strongest incentives to offer 
low corporate tax rates, despite possible mitigating factors such as strategic behavior and 
distortions induced by other policies.  While there are few tests of the proposition that the supply 
of capital to small countries is more elastic than the supply of capital to large countries, this is 
more than a matter of faith, since, in most models, it follows as an implication of their relatively 
small domestic business tax bases.
9  Whether countries actually design their policies based on 
these presumed elasticities is another matter. 
Larger countries have stronger incentives to tax foreign investors, since they are able to 
extract some rents by virtue of the fact that prices in their economies need not respond to tax 
policies in a way that maintains unchanged the investors’ after-tax profit margins.  Possibly 
weighing against this is strategic competition among large countries, whose tax policies may be 
designed in a way that reflects their likely effects on the policies of other countries.  Another 
consideration is that the inability to tailor tax and other policies perfectly might change efficient 
levels of taxation from what they would be in the absence of other distortions.  For example, 
trade barriers may distort local prices and thereby influence the efficient taxation of foreign 
direct investment.  If countries are unable to impose corrective taxes or subsidies on externality-
producing activities of corporations, then modifications to corporate income tax rates might 
serve as indirect remedies.  Similarly, if personal income taxation cannot be tailored to achieve 
efficient redistribution, then there may be circumstances in which efficient third-best tax policies 
might include distortionary corporate taxes.  Finally, large countries might have personal income 
tax rates that differ from those in small countries.  Efforts to align top personal and corporate tax 
rates in order to prevent tax arbitrage would then produce correlations between corporate tax 
                                                 
8 See Gordon (1986) for an elaboration of this argument, and Gordon and Hines (2002) for a further exposition. 
9 See, for example, Bucovetsky (1991). 
  9rates and country sizes that stem from the determinants of personal income tax rates rather than 
efficient taxation of inbound foreign investment. 
  Several country-specific considerations therefore affect the consequences of taxing 
internationally mobile capital.  It is noteworthy that, even in the absence of special 
considerations, international tax competition may produce outcomes in which capital taxes are 
higher than they would be in the absence of competition.  This can happen when there is foreign 
ownership of productive factors, when competing countries differ greatly in size, or when 
multiple governments attempt to tax the same income sources. 
The case of foreign ownership is clear: governments that care only about the welfares of 
domestic residents have incentives to adopt policies that enrich residents at the expense of 
foreigners.  Foreign ownership of local firms may encourage governments to raise local capital 
tax rates above the levels they would impose in the absence of economic openness, since much 
of the tax burden is borne by owners to whom the taxing government is largely indifferent.  Even 
foreign ownership of local land may trigger higher corporate tax rates, if the burden of corporate 
taxes is in part borne by landowners in the form of lower prices.  Finally, governments may have 
incentives to overtax the foreign earnings of domestic companies, since doing so discourages 
foreign investment and thereby directs resources to the home economy, a valuable exchange in 
the presence of tax or other distortions.
10  If all governments respond to these incentives then the 
result is that capital can be overtaxed in equilibrium. 
Competition among countries of differing sizes creates incentives for jurisdictions to 
choose tax policies strategically to manipulate international prices to their own advantage.  As 
DePater and Myers (1994) note, large capital importing countries have incentives to tax capital 
heavily in order to reduce capital demand and therefore depress the world price of capital that 
domestic importers must pay.  By the same reasoning, capital exporting countries have 
incentives to subsidize capital investment in order to raise prices, but if the exporting countries 
are smaller than the importers, it may not be in the interest of any individual exporter acting on 
                                                 
10 Huizinga and Nielsen (1997) analyze incentives to increase corporate tax rates when foreigners make local 
corporate investments, Richter and Wellisch (1996) consider the case of foreign-owned land, and Mintz and Tulkens 
(1996) analyze incentives to overtax foreign income. 
  10its own to offer such subsidies.  The result is that international tax competition produces higher 
average capital tax rates than in the absence of competition. 
What is the likely impact of tax competition on tax rates and government revenues?  In a 
simple setting of symmetric countries, no special considerations or distortions, no foreign 
ownership, and governments that must finance all of their expenditures with capital income 
taxation, Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991) confirm that international competition reduces 
government revenue and expenditures below efficient levels that would be chosen in the absence 
of competition.  Oates and Schwab (1988) note that this conclusion depends critically on the 
assumption that governments do not have access to revenue sources other than capital income 
taxes, since the availability of nondistortionary alternatives eliminates any impact of capital taxes 
on government spending levels.  Since governments rely on many revenue sources other than 
capital income taxes, since foreign ownership is common, countries differ in size, and tax 
policies are often used to correct economic distortions that cannot be more easily addressed some 
other way, it is possible for greater international economic mobility not to depress total 
government revenues. 
Governments unable to raise significant amounts of revenue by taxing mobile business 
income may be able to use other taxes, but the revenue potentials of some alternatives to 
business taxes are to a lesser degree also limited by international considerations.  In the case of 
personal income taxes, the ability to use international financial transactions may facilitate tax 
avoidance by high income taxpayers, and international mobility of individuals and their earnings 
increases the mobility of the personal income tax base.
11  Furthermore, downward pressure on 
business tax rates created by international competition is likely to exert downward pressure on 
top personal income tax rates also, due to the ability of taxpayers to select the forms of business 
organization.  Top personal income tax rates that greatly exceed top corporate income tax rates 
create incentives for individuals to create corporations financed with personal investments that 
effectively convert personal income into corporate income, thereby undermining the revenue 
potential of high personal tax rates and in the process inefficiently directing their investments 
                                                 
11 See, for example, Gordon and Nielsen (1997), who note that individuals have greater international tax avoidance 
opportunities under income taxation than under value-added taxation, and who use Danish data to estimate the 
magnitude of the difference. 
  11(Gordon and Mackie-Mason, 1995).  In response to this possibility, many governments are loath 
to introduce significant distinctions between top personal and business tax rates. 
Taxing personal income entails taxing the returns to capital, which in turn reduces 
incentives to save and invest.  The modern theory of capital accumulation notes that the 
imposition of capital income taxes creates inefficiencies by introducing growing tax wedges 
between consumption early in life and consumption many years later.
12  The inefficiencies 
associated with taxing capital income are in no way mitigated, and are quite possibly increased, 
by the availability of international capital markets that make the supply of capital investment 
opportunities close to perfectly elastic.
13  Consequently greater access to world capital markets 
increases the efficiency costs associated with income taxation. 
4. World  patterns 
The United States has a smaller government than many of its peer nations in the OECD, 
and the composition of U.S. tax revenues likewise differs significantly from those of other 
countries.  Table 3 presents OECD data on government finances of OECD countries in 2004.  In 
that year U.S. tax revenues were 25.5 percent of GDP, significantly lower than the OECD 
average of 35.9 percent and the European Union average of 39.7 percent.  Personal income taxes 
accounted for 34.7 percent of U.S. tax receipts, significantly higher than the OECD average of 
24.6 percent.  The United States raised 8.7 percent of its total tax receipts from corporate income 
taxes, a shade lower than the OECD average of 9.6 percent, but raised only 18.3 percent of total 
tax revenue from taxes on goods and services, compared with 32.3 percent for OECD countries 
as a whole.  
A major reason that the United States relies so much less than other countries do on 
taxing goods and services is that, alone among OECD nations, the United States does not have a 
value-added tax, which is a sophisticated form of a sales tax.  For most of the world the major 
tax event of the late twentieth century is the widespread adoption of value-added taxes.  Whereas 
by 1966 only two countries had introduced value-added taxes, by 1985, 35 countries had done 
so, and in 2004, 134 countries collected significant tax revenue with value-added taxes.  Every 
                                                 
12 See, for example, Chamley (1986) and the discussion in Auerbach and Hines (2002). 
13 See the discussion in Correia (1996). 
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and that range from Denmark, Hungary, and Sweden at the high end imposing 25 percent value-
added tax rates, and Japan, Canada, and Switzerland at the low end all using value-added tax 
rates in the 5.0 – 7.5 percent range. 
Table 4 presents information on top personal and corporate tax rates among OECD 
countries in 2004.  The U.S. top personal tax rate of 41.4 percent is almost identical to the OECD 
average of 41.3 percent, though the U.S. corporate tax rate of 39.3 percent is the highest among 
OECD countries, significantly exceeding the OECD average of 29.8 percent.  By the OECD’s 
calculations, the U.S. tax burden on an average production worker reduces disposable income to 
76.6 percent of take-home pay for single individuals and 95.5 percent of income for families 
with two children, in both cases representing smaller tax burdens than the OECD average. 
4.1 Income  taxes 
The United States is typical among large countries in relying heavily on personal income 
taxes and corporate income taxes to finance government expenditures.  Figure 1 presents 
information from the IMF Government Finance Statistics on fractions of total national tax 
revenue accounted for by the sum of personal income taxes and corporate income taxes.  The top 
panel of Figure 1 presents two loci: the triangles represent averages for the quarter of the sample 
of countries with the largest populations, whereas the diamonds represent averages for the 
quarter of the sample of countries with the smallest populations.  This is an unbalanced panel, 
since country coverage in the IMF data varies a bit from year to year; and to a lesser degree, 
differential population growth rates change the identities of the largest and smallest countries 
over time. 
It is clear from the bottom panel of Figure 1 that large countries rely most heavily on 
income taxes.  In a typical early year, such as 1972, the average large country drew 41.6 percent 
of its total tax revenue from personal and corporate income taxes, whereas the comparable figure 
for the average small country was 34.5 percent.  These differences have not narrowed over time: 
by 2003, income taxes accounted for 43.9 percent of tax revenue in large countries, and only 
27.5 percent of revenue in small countries. 
  13One of the difficulties of interpreting the information in the top panel of Figure 1 is that 
the composition of large and small countries in the sample changes over time as populations 
change and IMF data availability fluctuates.  The bottom panel of Figure 1 presents the same 
information for a balanced panel of countries between 1973 and 2001, a span of time over which 
the IMF data are most plentiful.  Countries in this sample are assigned to the top size quartile and 
bottom size quartile based on their 1973 populations.  As is evident from the figure, differences 
in the extent to which small and large countries rely on personal income taxes have increased 
over time.  In 1973 the larger countries in this sample raised an average of 41.5 percent of their 
tax revenue from personal and corporate income taxes, whereas smaller countries raised only 
31.2 percent of their tax revenue from income taxes.  By 2001, larger countries relied on 
personal and corporate income taxes for 48.9 percent of their tax revenues, and smaller countries 
relied on income taxes for 29.9 percent. 
The reason to distinguish countries by size is that economic openness is commonly 
thought to be a function of country size: there are good reasons to believe that large countries 
have internal markets that are larger as fractions of their total markets than is the case for smaller 
countries.  The IMF evidence is consistent with this interpretation, as the standard measure of 
economic openness (the ratio of a country’s exports plus imports divided by its GDP) is 
negatively correlated with country size.  Appendix Table 1 presents annual cross-sectional 
correlations between country sizes (as measured by log population) and the standard measure of 
economic openness; between 1972 and 2006, this correlation varies between -0.32 and -0.22, and 
is always statistically significant. 
It is possible to compare the tax policies of countries with differing degrees of openness, 
though one of the difficulties of such a comparison is that import and export performance is 
arguably affected by a country’s tax policies, and therefore not entirely appropriate as an 
independent source of variation.  It is nevertheless instructive to consider such a comparison, as 
presented in Figure 2.  The evidence in the top panel of Figure 2 is that since the early 1980s 
countries with less open economies (as measured by ratios of exports plus imports to GDP) have 
relied more heavily on income taxes than do countries with more open economies.  This 
difference is more pronounced in the balanced panel comparison presented in the bottom panel 
  14of Figure 2, where if anything the difference between reliance on income taxes by countries with 
open and closed economies has if anything has widened over time. 
The IMF data distinguish income tax revenues by personal and corporate taxes, though 
with spotty coverage and some uncertainty over which revenues are allocated to each category.  
As a result, any analysis of corporate or personal income taxes in isolation must be treated with 
some caution. The top panel of Figure 3 presents information on differences in the extent to 
which a balanced panel of large and small countries rely on corporate tax revenue over the 1973-
1999 period for which data are most plentiful; this evidence illustrates the persistent pattern that 
smaller countries collect significantly less corporate tax revenue as fractions of total taxes.  The 
bottom panel of Figure 3 presents similar information for open and closed economies over the 
1975-1998 period, with less open economies relying to greater degrees on corporate tax sources. 
Table 5 presents evidence of the impact of country size and affluence on the extent to 
which countries rely on personal and corporate income taxes.  The table presents six cross-
sectional regressions, two for 1973, two for 1985, and two for 1999; the dates were chosen with 
the goals of covering a wide range of years and also maintaining sizeable country coverage for 
the regressions.  The regression in column one suggests that larger and more affluent countries 
may have relied more heavily than other countries on personal and corporate income taxes in 
1973, though the estimated coefficients are not statistically significant.  In the regression for 
1985 presented in column three country sizes and levels of affluence have more statistical power 
in explaining the use of income taxes.  The 0.019 coefficient implies that doubling a country’s 
population is associated with a 1.9 percent higher ratio of income taxes to total tax collections, 
and the 0.053 coefficient implies that wealthier countries rely more heavily on income taxes. 
The regressions reported in columns 5 and 6 of Table 5 indicate that the effect of country 
size became stronger by 1999.  The 0.051 coefficient in column 5 of Table 5 is very similar to 
the corresponding 0.053 coefficient in column 3, but the statistically significant 0.042 coefficient 
in column 5 indicates that doubling a country’s population is associated with a 4.2 percent higher 
ratio of income taxes to total taxes, corresponding to roughly a ten percent greater reliance on 
income taxes.  The regression reported in column six reveals that the effects of country size and 
affluence are concentrated in their interaction: the 0.015 coefficient on the interaction term is 
  15large and statistically significant, whereas the estimated coefficients on the uninteracted 
population and per capita income variables are negative. 
It is possible to use the panel nature of the data to identify the impact of changes in 
population and income levels on the use of personal and corporate income taxes.  The panel 
estimates include country and year fixed effects, which absorb the impact of persistent 
differences between countries and common effects of changes over time.  In estimating these 
relationships in a panel framework it is necessary to normalize for the persistent increases in 
population and income levels that characterize the experience of most countries between 1972 
and 2006.  In the panel regressions that follow, the log income, log population, and interaction of 
log income and log population variables are normalized by dividing them by annual means of 
these variables, as a result of which the means of the regression variables are (by construction) 
one in each year (and for the sample as a whole).  
Table 6 presents panel estimates of the determinants of personal and corporate income 
tax collections as a fraction of total taxes.  These regressions include year and country fixed 
effects, and represent an unbalanced panel, in that not every country is included every year.
14  At 
a first look the evidence in the first column of Table 6 gives a rather different impression than the 
cross sectional regressions in Table 5.  As in the cross sectional regressions, higher income levels 
are associated with greater use of personal income taxes, the 0.257 coefficient in column one 
implying that doubling a country’s income level is associated with a 25.7 percent higher ratio of 
personal taxes to total taxes.  The striking -2.985 coefficient in the same column, however, 
implies that high levels of national population growth are associated with reduced use of 
personal income taxes.  Introduction of a variable capturing the interaction of country size and 
affluence in the regression reported in column 2 changes these results rather little. 
One question raised by these regression results is the extent to which the effects of 
income and population may change over the 1972-2006 time period.  The regression reported in 
column three introduces additional variables that interact starting (1972) population and income 
levels with time, where time is a variable taking the value one in 1972 and 35 in 2006.  
Introduction of these time interaction variables somewhat enhances the estimated size of income 
  16effects, as reflected in the 0.418 coefficient in column 3.  The 0.011 coefficient on the interaction 
of time and normalized income indicates that countries that were more affluent in 1972 tended to 
increase their use of income taxes over the sample period compared to other countries.   
Introducing time interactions has a more striking effect on estimated population effects.  
The estimated coefficient on normalized population is small and insignificant in the regression 
reported in column three, whereas the 0.021 coefficient on the interaction of time and initial 
population indicates that countries with small populations in 1972 relied to declining degrees on 
income taxes over time.  Introducing interactions between population and income in the 
regression reported in column four reveals that wealthy large countries made greater use of 
income taxes over time, as reflected in the estimated 0.052 coefficient. 
4.2 Expenditure  taxes 
Figure 4 presents ratios of expenditure taxes – the sum of indirect taxes on goods and 
services and international trade taxes (chiefly tariffs) – to total tax revenue.  It is evident from 
both the unbalanced and balanced panels displayed in Figure 4 that small countries finance much 
more of their governments through expenditure taxes than do large countries.  The information in 
the lower panel of Figure 4 suggests that differences related to country sizes have not fallen over 
time, but instead remain quite substantial.
15
Figure 5 compares the use of expenditure taxes by countries with more and less open 
economies.  The evidence presented in the top panel of Figure 5 suggests that more open 
economies have relied relatively heavily on expenditure taxes since the early 1980s, though this 
was not true prior to that.  Evidence from the balanced panel of countries displayed in the bottom 
panel of Figure 5, however, indicates that more open economies have consistently used 
expenditure taxes to greater degrees than less open economies.
16
                                                                                                                                                             
14 Results for a balanced panel of data covering a smaller number of countries for 1973-1999 are very similar to 
those reported for the larger unbalanced panel. 
15 The expenditure tax patterns displayed in Figure 4, and the subsequent regressions, are more than simply the 
mirror images of the income tax evidence, since countries have access to many taxes other than income and 
expenditure taxes, including property taxes, estate and inheritance taxes, stamp duties, payroll taxes, and others. 
16 This evidence in Figure 5 must be interpreted with caution, since expenditure taxes include trade taxes that 
themselves are likely to influence economic openness. 
  17Table 7 presents evidence that country size and per capita income are consistently 
associated with smaller ratios of expenditure taxes to total tax revenues.  The -0.041 coefficient 
in column 1 implies that doubling a country’s population in 1973 is associated with 4.1 percent 
smaller ratio of expenditure taxes to total tax revenue; and the -0.048 coefficient similarly 
implies that doubling a country’s per capita income is associated with a 4.8 percent smaller ratio 
of expenditure taxes to total tax revenue.  These effects persist in the regressions for 1985 and 
1999, presented in columns 3-6 of Table 4, indicating that expenditure taxes are most heavily 
used by small and poor countries. 
The panel evidence, reported in Table 8, is quite consistent with the cross sectional 
evidence appearing in Table 7.  The -0.442 coefficient reported in column one implies that 
growing income levels are associated with reduced reliance on expenditure taxes, and the -1.435 
coefficient indicates that population growth is likewise associated with less use of expenditure 
taxes.  Inclusion of an interaction between population and income in the regression reported in 
column two changes these results very little, though the estimated income effect becomes 
statistically insignificant.  And adding interactions between time and initial income and 
population levels in the regressions reported in columns 3 and 4 again does little to change the 
implications of the regression reported in column 1, that countries whose populations and income 
levels grow smaller make greater relative use of expenditure taxes. 
5. Implications 
The international evidence indicates that governments of countries with smaller and more 
open economies rely less on personal and corporate income taxes, and more on expenditure and 
trade taxes, than do other governments.  Doubtless this reflects many aspects of their economic 
and political situations, including that properly designed expenditure-type taxes (though typically 
not trade taxes) can create fewer economic distortions than many income taxes. 
The United States currently taxes personal and corporate income at high rates compared 
to other countries, particularly given the relatively small size of the U.S. public sector.  As the 
world economy becomes more integrated, the cost of this type of income taxation will grow 
relative to the cost of expenditure tax alternatives.  There has been consistent U.S. resistance to 
the prospect of introducing extensive expenditure taxation of the type embodied in value-added 
  18taxes or reform of the personal income tax that would give it explicit expenditure tax features.  
One of the political obstacles that a value-added tax or any other broad based consumption tax 
must overcome in the United States is the concern, in some circles, that such taxes are too 
efficient at raising revenue, that they too easily accommodate big government.  While there is 
little in the way of econometric support for the notion that the adoption of a value-added tax 
encourages government growth (see, e.g., Metcalf, 1995), it is noteworthy that Michigan, the 
only state in the country to use a value-added tax instead of a corporate income tax, taxed 
businesses more heavily than did any other state during in the years when its value-added tax 
was in place (Hines, 2003).  In an era in which governments face growing demands for their 
services, and in which other sources of tax revenue confront growing challenges and are 
increasingly inefficient, it may not be surprising that governments all over the world have come 
to rely more heavily on expenditure taxes to meet their revenue needs. 
Distributional issues present some of the greatest challenges of globalization, since 
growing international trade and investment affect income distributions directly by changing 
relative prices and indirectly by affecting the range of feasible government policies.  In practice 
many expenditure taxes are considerably less progressive than income tax alternatives, so 
movement away from income taxation and in the direction of greater expenditure taxation is 
typically associated with less equal after-tax distributions of income.  Governments that are 
concerned about growing income inequality and that feel pressured to move their tax systems 
more strongly in the direction of expenditure taxation therefore can be expected to look for 
progressive alternatives to standard policy choices.  Such alternatives may include progressive 
forms of expenditure taxation and expenditure policies, such as education and training programs, 
that support income creation by less affluent members of the population. 
The fiscal challenges facing governments in the era of globalization are unlikely to be 
addressed with single answers such as expanded education programs, but instead strategies that 
include broad ranges of government policy initiatives.  International agreements have the 
potential to play significant roles in these strategies.  It is already the case that governments 
cooperate in international settings such as the World Trade Organization to promote international 
trade and investment, and bilateral and multilateral tax agreements and initiatives serve the 
function of facilitating tax enforcement and avoidance of double taxation of international 
  19income.  Doubtless governments will come to rely more heavily on international agreements in 
the years to come, but it remains to be seen whether they will accelerate or offset the recent trend 
in the direction of expenditure taxation.
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Note: the two panels of Figure 1 depict the sum of personal and corporate income taxes as 
fractions of total national tax revenue for samples of small and large countries. 
 




































































































































































Source: Congressional Budget Office. 
Note: the income concept is comprehensive family income, that includes an adjustment for 
family size.
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Table 3.      
   % of total tax receipts from 
2004 
Total tax 









Australia  31.2 40.2 18.2 28.5 
Austria 42.6  22.7  5.4  28.2 
Belgium 45.0  30.6  8.0  25.0 
Canada  33.5 35.1 10.3 25.9 
Czech  Republic  38.4 12.7 12.4 31.2 
Denmark 48.8  50.7 6.5 32.7 
Finland 44.2  30.5  8.1  31.7 
France 43.4  17.0  6.3  25.6 
Germany 34.7  22.8 4.5 29.2 
Greece 35.0  13.8  9.4  37.1 
Hungary 38.1  17.8  5.8  40.8 
Iceland 38.7  36.9  3.3  41.1 
Ireland  30.1 27.4 11.9 37.8 
Italy 41.1  25.4  6.9  26.4 
Japan  26.4 17.8 14.2 20.0 
Korea  24.6 13.6 14.3 36.3 
Luxembourg  37.8 17.8 15.3 30.4 
Mexico 19.0  24.6  .  55.5 
Netherlands 37.5  16.4  8.2  32.0 
New  Zealand  35.6 41.0 15.5 33.8 
Norway  44.0 23.5 22.6 29.7 
Poland 34.4  12.0  5.8  36.0 
Portugal 34.5  15.9  8.3  38.6 
Slovak 
Republic 30.3  9.3 8.1  39.8 
Spain 34.8  17.7  9.8  28.0 
Sweden 50.4  31.4  6.3  25.8 
Switzerland 29.2  34.8  8.6  23.7 
Turkey 31.3  14.9  7.3  47.7 
United 
Kingdom 36.0  28.7 8.1 32.0 
United States  25.5  34.7  8.7  18.3 
EU Average  39.7  24.6  8.2  30.7 
OECD Average  35.9  24.6  9.6  32.3 
     
. Not available or not applicable.       
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Table 4.      
   
  Highest rates of income taxes 
Disposable income of average 









Single person  Married with 
two children 
Australia  48.5 30.0 76.3 89.9 
Austria  42.9 34.0 67.0 82.1 
Belgium  45.1 34.0 58.1 78.1 
Canada  46.4 36.1 76.1 87.8 
Czech  Republic  28.0 28.0 76.2 95.9 
Denmark  55.0 30.0 59.1 71.0 
Finland  50.3 29.0 68.9 76.9 
France  36.7 35.4 71.2 83.0 
Germany  47.5 38.9 56.5 76.7 
Greece  33.6 35.0 77.5 77.0 
Hungary  56.0 16.0 65.6 80.3 
Iceland  42.0 18.0 74.7 94.6 
Ireland  42.0 12.5 83.1  102.5 
Italy  41.4 33.0 72.7 85.7 
Japan  47.2 39.5 81.8 84.9 
Korea  36.6 29.7 90.1 91.3 
Luxembourg  33.9 30.4 73.5 99.6 
Mexico  26.4 33.0 94.8 94.8 
Netherlands  52.0 34.5 67.5 77.7 
New  Zealand  39.0 33.0 80.0 82.0 
Norway  47.5 28.0 69.9 79.2 
Poland  26.2 19.0 68.2 70.1 
Portugal  35.6 27.5 78.2 89.8 
Slovak 
Republic  16.5 19.0 77.8 97.2 
Spain  45.0 35.0 80.0 87.6 
Sweden  56.5 28.0 68.5 75.9 
Switzerland  37.8 24.1 78.4 90.6 
Turkey  40.6 33.0 69.5 69.5 
United 
Kingdom  40.0 30.0 73.4 80.5 
United  States  41.4 39.3 76.6 95.5 
EU  Average  43.8 31.1 70.3 82.9 
OECD  Average  41.3 29.8 73.7 84.9 
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Table 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(population) 0.025 0.049 0.019 ‐0.063 0.042 ‐0.081
(0.015) (0.090) (0.010) (0.059) 0.009 (0.053)
ln(per capita GDP) 0.016 0.069 0.053 ‐0.117 0.051 ‐0.197
(0.016) (0.196) (0.015) (0.122) 0.011 (0.106)
ln(pop)*ln(p.c. GDP) ‐0.003 0.011 0.015
(0.012) (0.008) (0.007)
N 6 46 4 7 77 7 7 17 1






(1) (2) (3) (4)
normalized ln (population) ‐2.985 ‐2.789 ‐0.006 2.996
(0.358) (0.530) (0.457) (0.753)
normalized ln (GDP)  0.257 0.447 0.418 2.976









N 2,353 2,353 1,891 1,891













( 1 )( 2 ) ( 3 )( 4 ) ( 5 )( 6 )
ln(pop) ‐0.041 0.012 ‐0.033 0.072 ‐0.044 0.022
(0.013) (0.075) (0.010) (0.058) (0.010) (0.058)
ln(p.c. GDP) ‐0.048 0.069 ‐0.098 0.121 ‐0.054 0.078
(0.014) (0.164) (0.015) (0.120) (0.012) (0.116)
ln(pop)*ln(p.c. GDP) ‐0.007 ‐0.014 ‐0.008
(0.010) (0.007) (0.007)
N 6 46 4 7 77 7 7 07 0
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Table 8
(1) (2) (3) (4)
normalized ln (population) ‐1.435 ‐1.584 ‐1.210 ‐2.533
(0.382) (0.565) (0.509) (0.847)
normalized ln (GDP) ‐ 0.442 ‐0.587 ‐0.397 ‐1.552









N 2,345 2,345 1,883 1,883
















1972  96 ‐ 0.3221  0.0014
1973  100 ‐ 0.3231  0.0010
1974  102 ‐ 0.3254  0.0008
1975  108 ‐ 0.3127  0.0010
1976  110 ‐ 0.3002  0.0014
1977  111 ‐ 0.3113  0.0009
1978  114 ‐ 0.3274  0.0004
1979  113 ‐ 0.3247  0.0005
1980  119 ‐ 0.3098  0.0006
1981  119 ‐ 0.3049  0.0007
1982  120 ‐ 0.2998  0.0009
1983  121 ‐ 0.2895  0.0013
1984  122 ‐ 0.2881  0.0013
1985  124 ‐ 0.3126  0.0004
1986  125 ‐ 0.3010  0.0006
1987  126 ‐ 0.2994  0.0007
1988  127 ‐ 0.2877  0.0010
1989  127 ‐ 0.2858  0.0011
1990  130 ‐ 0.2817  0.0012
1991  134 ‐ 0.2657  0.0019
1992  136 ‐ 0.2525  0.0030
1993  143 ‐ 0.2786  0.0008
1994  145 ‐ 0.2982  0.0003
1995  147 ‐ 0.2910  0.0003
1996  148 ‐ 0.2804  0.0006
1997  151 ‐ 0.2449  0.0024
1998  149 ‐ 0.2369  0.0036
1999  147 ‐ 0.2552  0.0018
2000  147 ‐ 0.2563  0.0017
2001  146 ‐ 0.2593  0.0016
2002  145 ‐ 0.2545  0.0020
2003  142 ‐ 0.2558  0.0021
2004  139 ‐ 0.2452  0.0036
2005  130 ‐ 0.2380  0.0064




(1), (2) ln(pop) 15.650 15.712 1.697 64
(1), (2) ln(p.c. GDP) 6.757 6.828 1.601 64
(2) ln(pop)*ln(p.c. GDP) 105.67 99.67 28.20 64
(3), (4) ln(pop) 15.573 15.807 2.078 77
(3), (4) ln(p.c. GDP) 7.614 7.596 1.366 77
(4) ln(pop)*ln(p.c. GDP) 118.54 117.51 26.79 77
(5), (6) ln(pop) 16.069 15.913 1.718 71
(5), (6) ln(p.c. GDP) 8.037 8.204 1.447 71
(6) ln(pop)*ln(p.c. GDP) 128.82 126.17 25.78 71
Standard 
Deviation
N Specification(s) Variable Mean Median
  38Appendix Table 3
Means and Standard Deviations for Cross‐Sectional Regressions in Table 6
(1), (2) normalized ln (population) 1 1.003 0.117 2,353
(1), (2) normalized ln (GDP)  1 1.001 0.171 2,353
(2) Interaction of normalized population and GDP 1 0.981 0.202 2,353
(3), (4) normalized ln (population) 1 0.999 0.109 1,891
(3), (4) normalized ln (GDP)  1 1.002 0.172 1,891
(4) Interaction of normalized population and GDP 1 0.974 0.197 1,891
(3), (4) normalized ln (population)*time 15.5 14.73 9.250 1,891
(3), (4) normalized ln (GDP)*time 15.5 14.40 9.722 1,891
(4) Interaction of normalized population and GDP*time 15.5 14.24 9.891 1,891
Standard 
Deviation
N Specification(s) Variable Mean Median
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